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(i) S 120 (3) Trade Marks Act 1995
In 1995 the new Trade Marks Act 1995 (Oh) in implementing
Art 16 (3) World Trade Organisation Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)} introduced s 120 (3) the scope
of which to this point has not been fully explored. 111e issue of Internet
domain name allocation has thrown s 120 (3) into the spotlight. The
question remains whether the provision introduces the concept of
dilution into Australian law. 111e key question is as to the meaning of
the word }}connection}} in s 120 (3).2
A trade mark is infringed for the purposes of s 120 (3) if:
• the trade mark is well known in Australia;3 and
• the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with}
or deceptively similar! to} the trade mark in relation to;
• goods ("unrelated goods") that are not of the same description as that
of the goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered5
("registered goods") or are not closely related to services in respect of
which the trade mark is registered ("registered services"); or
• services ("unrelated services") that are not of the same description as
that of the registered services or are not closely related to registered
goods; and
• because the trade mark is well known} the sign would be likely to be
taken as indicating a connection between the unrelated goods or services
and the registered ovmer of the trade mark; and
• for that reason} the interests of the registered owner are likely to be
adversely affected.
The Australian Act requires use of a mark that is the same or
deceptively similar to a well known mark as a trademark (regarding
unrelated goods or services) where use of the mark is likely to indicate
See further Radio Corporation Pty Ltd v Disnet) (1937) 57 CLR 448.
For "well known in Australia" see subsection 120 (4): In decicling} for the
purposes of paragraph (3)(a), whether a trade mark is "well known in Australia",
one must take account of the extent to which the trade mark is known within the
relevant sector of the public, whether as a result of the promotion of the trade
mark or for any other reason. On the clifference between famous and we11-
known marks see VVIPQ, Final Report on the Intemet Domain Name Process (1999)
Chapter 4 <http://www_wipo.org>.
For "deceptively sinwar" see s10 Trade Ivfark Act- Further on this concept see:
Mid Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Company Ltd (1998) 40 IPR 20 at 32;
Southem Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundn) Ph) Ltd (1953) 91 CLR 592 at
595
For "registered trade mark" see section 6 Trade Mark Act.
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a connection with the well known mark and thereby adversely affect
the interests of the registered o\vner. If "connection" is to some degree
based on a notion of consumer confusion then it could be argued this
provision does not introduce the concept of dilution into Australian
law. However it is arguable that using the value of a well knm-vn mark
to attract a person's attention to your commodity (attention grabbing)
wherein consumer confusion is not present, would mean that you have
misappropriated the (pulling power or) value of the well known mark
through word association Le. connection, but you have not confused
consumers..
In the recent Coca-Cola case6 it was argued (amongst other things)
that the distribution of cola flavoured confectionery, similar in
appearance to the famous Coke bottle,was an infringement of a well-
known mark (the Coke bottle) pursuant to s 120 (3). Merkel J
dismissed the claim on the ground that the sign (bottle shape) was not
used as a tTademark (i.e. to designate origin of the goods). Of
particular interest were his (arguably obiter) observations on the notion
of 11connection". Relying on an earlier decision concerning s 52 Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Oh) Merkel J explained that?:
"..... the representation or use of the reputation of a well-known
mark does not necessarily indicate or connote connection with the
proprietor of the mark. For example, in the context of a misleading and
deceptive conduct claim under s 52 of the TPA, a respondent's use of a
well known name, character or concept of another corporation waS
held not to infringe s 52 as the use was held not to imply an association
with or endorsement by the other corporation: see Mcnhenny Co v Blu.e
Yonder Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) IPR 187 at 199 and 201 per Lehane J. 8
"....Thus, the cola bottle confectionery is merely recognisable as having
the well known shape of the contour bottle but \vould not be likely to
be believed or expected to have a trade or commercial connection of
some kind with the applicant by reason of having that shape."
(emphasis added).
With respect to his Honour the statute does not explicitly
require that the connection be ofa trade or commercial kind (an aspect
6 Coca-Cola Co '0 All-Feet Distributing Co [1998] 43 IPR 47.
7 Ibid at 62-65,
8 In Merkel r to words: "there was an absence of any representation of connection".
"Representation of connection" is not required by s 120 (3).
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of consumer confusion). It is conceivable and consistent with the
statute that connection could be founded on psychological or cultural
grounds (the psychological pulling power or cOJ;IUnodification value of
the mark).
(ii) s 10 (3) Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK)
The UK Trade Marks Act 1994, s10(3) provides that a mark may
:infringe the rights of a registered trademark holder if used in relation
to dissimilar goods or services notwithstanding the absence of
confusion, mistake, deception or the likelihood of such. The section
reads:
rAJ person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of
trade a sign which-
(a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to
those for which the iTade mark is registered,
where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the
use of the sign being without due cause, takes unfair advantage of or is
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.
111e UK Act does not require use of the mark as a trademark
but does require use in the course of trade; it does not use the tenns
famous or well knovm merely the word "reputation"; and requires
unfair advantage of or detriment to the distinctive character or repute
of the mark. The section clearly aims to prevent unfair advantage
being taken of the value of trademark reputation established through
cmnmodification (advertising etc).9
(iii) s 43 (c) Lanham Act (USA)
The US provision provides:
"43 c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems
reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark
9 British Sugar plc v James Robertson & Sons Lid [1996] RPC 281; British Telecommunications
plc v One in a Million [1999] FSR 1
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has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark/ and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection.
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may
consider factors such as, but not limited to -
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the
mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection
with the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the
mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used;
(E) the chalU1els of trade for the goods or services with which
the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas
and channels of trade used by the maTks' ovvner and the
person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nahn'e and extent of use of the same or similar marks
by third parties; aled
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March
3/ 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register. , .."
The US provision simply uses the words "causes dilution" to
the distinctive nature of the mark. The term "dilution" is defined in s
45 (Lanham Act) to mean the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services. lO
10 TT McCarthy, "The 1996 United States Federal Ant-Dilution Statute" (1998) 9 AIP! 38.
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(iv) Rationale of the Dilution Doctrine
Those questioning the underlying rationale of dilution claim
the concept is simply an extreme form of consumer confusion and that
dilution and confusion are parts of the one argument. ll The UK and
us provisions do not require use of the infringing mark or sign as a
lTade mark and would clearly cover (non confusing) domain namest
wh.ilethe AUSl-ralian provision requires the mark to be used to label
the source of goods or servicest that is, as a trademark. Tllerefore in
Australia, it could be said that s 120 (3) is based on a special case of
consumer confusion and that is what the word "connection" indicates.
Others argue that famous marks are part of cultural discourse
and should be free to use in expressive contexts.12 VVhile each statute
allows for fair use/dealing of famous or well-kno",m marks: s 43 (4)
Lanham Act; s 122 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth); Art 17 TRIPS t the
investment of the trademark holder in commodifying the cultural icon
is clearly protected. The mischief being avoided in these provisions is
the using of the notoriety of the mark to attract people to commerce
through cultural command and mystification but not through
confusion; and that is arl instance, especially in the comm,ercial context,
of l.mjust enrichment (misappropriation). Just as people are atlncted
to famous peopk people are attracted to famous signs but on getting
to the product and finding out it is not the real thing which in many
cases will be obvious, the cultural command (cf. the notion of
"commercial magnetism": lvIishawaka Rubber & WolIen lvIfg. Co. v S.S.
Kresge Co. 13, San Francisco Arts and Athletics Tnc v LIS Olympics
Committee14) has provided a vruling consumer: Radio Corporation Pty
Ltd v Disney;l5 Hogan v Koala Dundee Pty Ud16; Pacific Dunlop Ltd v
Hoganl7; Twentieth Century Fox Film Productions v SA Brewing Co LtdI8 .
Should you have to pay for this service?
11 See Fruit of the Loom [ne v Girouard 994 F. 2d. 1359 at 1363 (9 th Circ 1993).
lZ Consider Boyle, J, Shamans, Software, Spleens (1996) Harvard University Press,
CillTLbridge :NlA.;Lange, D, "Recognising 'TI1e Public Domain" (1981) 44 Law and
Contemporan) Problems 147; Bcnlder, Y, "Free as the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain" (1999) 74 New York
University LR 354; Dreyfuss, R, "Expressive Generidty; Trademarks as Language
in the Pepsi Generation" (1990) 65 Noire Dmne LR 397.
13 316 US 203 at 205 (1942).
101 483 US 522 (1987).
15 (1937) 57 CLR 448.
16 (1988) 83 ALR 187, the "mental connection" at 189.
17 (1989) IPR 398.
18 (1996) 34 IPR 225
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TI1e series of decisions on domain names and WIPO I s Final
Report on the Internet Domain Name Process J9 suggest that there is strong
institutional support for the legal protection of informational value.2o
This obviously needs to be balanced against notions such as fair use21
and free speech.22
In this regard it is mteresting to ponder the prescient view of
the Frankfurther Jexpounded m 1942 in the Mishawaka Case:
"The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols,
it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trade mark is a
merchandismg short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he
wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a
mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to
impregnate the atmosphere of th.e market with the drawing power of a
congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-
to convey through the mark, m the minds of potential customers, the
desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is
attamed; the trade mark owner has somethmg of value. If another
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created,
the owner can obtain legal redress."23
19 SE:e especially Chapter 4, available at <http://www.wipo.org>
20 Fitzgerald, B, Gamertsfelder, L, GuUiksen, T, "Marketing Your Website: Legal
Issues Relating to TI'e Allocation of Internet Domain Names" (1998) UNSWLJ
549; Hourigan PI "Domain Names and Trade :Niarks" in Fitzgerald, A,
Fitzgerald, B, Cook, P, Cifuentes, C Going Digital: Legal Issues for Electronic
Commerce, Multimedia and the IMemet (1998) Prospect Publishing; Marks &
Spencer Plc v One In A Million Ltd [1998] Fleet Street Reports 265; cf AveIY
Dennison v Sumpton (9'" Circ 23.8.99 available at <http://www.findlaw.com>).
Fitzgerald, E, "Underlying Rationales of Fair Use" (1998) 2 5CULR 153; CLRC,
Simplification of the Copyright Act 1968 Part 11 (1998)
<http://www.law.gov.au!c!rc>.
Hamilton, M, "Database Protection and the Circuitous Route Around the US
Constitution" Paper presented at Inten:w.tional Intellectual Property and the
Common Law World Conference, Auckland, NZ, July 1999; Ham.ilton, M,
"Appropiation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial Conlrol Over
Copyrighted Worh" (1994) 42 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 93;
Benkler, Y, "Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain" (1999) 74 New York UniversitlJ LR 354; cf. San
Francisco Arts and Athletics Inc. v US Olympics Committee 483 US 522 (1987);
Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v Nation Enterprises 471 US 539 (1985); Zacchini v
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 433 U.s. 562 (1977).
Mishawaka Rllbber & Wollen A1fg. Co. v 5.5. Kresge Co. 316 US 203 at 205 (1942).
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The argument is simply stated: if someone is making
commercial gain from the inveshnent or value of another (eg. using the
magnetism of a famous mark primarily for commercial gain rather than
for expressive reasons24) that is a form of unjust enrichment, or
l.mauthorised appropriation: ("reaping where you have not sown"25\
l.mless you believe in an ethos that everything should be free. If the
touchstone is that we live in a market economy entrepreneurial effort
should be encouraged in fact and law, against a context of social
responsibility and the notions of fair use and free speech:
(commodifying value should not automatically mean legal
monopoly/ control/liability 26). In this sense one of the primary roles
of s 120 (3) is to prevent unjust enrichmentj the difficult task being to
conceptualise the unjust ITansactional factors (eg. misappropriation v
public domain) and quantify the nature of the enriclunent (e.g.
individual ownership v cultural resource)P
Z4 On tbis distinction see, Dreyfuss, R, "We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should
We Be Paying Rent? DeconslTUcting the LanhamAct and Rights of Publicity" (1996) 20
Columbia -VIA. Journal ofLaw & the Arts 123 at 140ft.
Z5 San Francisco Arts and Athletics Inc. v US Olympics Committee 483 US 522 (1987),
Qualitex Co. v Jacobsen Prods. Co. 514 US. 159, 163-4 (1995), Henderson v Radio
Carp Pty Lld (1960) SR(NSvV) 576 at 595 consider Tllmer v General Motors
(Australia) Pry Lld (1929) 42 CLR 352 at 368.
;>6 See Dreyfuss, R, 'We Are Symbols.." supra
"7 On the notion of unjust enrichment see: Fitzgerald, B, and Gamertsfelder, L,
"Protecting Informational Products through Unjust Enrichment Law" [1998] Eurapean
Intellectual Property Review 244
